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I 
Critics for the most part have avoided the writings 
of Thomas Pynchon. I suspect one reason for this is that 
present critical tools are inadequate for the purpose. 
Those critics who have analyzed V. and The Crying of Lot 
49, for instance, have labeled them "novels," IInew romance,1I 
"romantic epic," or "black humor.1I This disagreement 
suggests that critics have been trying too hard to classify 
these works which do not fulfill traditional expectations. 
In other words, the abstraction categories such as "novel," 
IInew romance," "romantic epic," and "black humor" are con-
structs which identify elements in the books but which 
limit the critic's overall view of the books. 
Two purposes have prompted this observation. First, 
I plan to approach Pynchon's "Entropy"l without attempting 
to apply traditional labels. As much as possible I intend 
to focus on how IIEntropyll works rather than on what it is. 
The second purpose is more important. Classification 
based on abstraction is raised as an epistemological issue 
in "Entropy.1I This issue forms the basis for an exploration 
of two ontological approaches suggested by the two scientific 
concepts of entropy: thermodynamic entropy and entropy of 
information. 
My main discussion will center on the relationship 
between the scientific concepts and the two strands of action 
in "Entropy.1I Viewed in this way, the conclusion of 
Pynchonts work 1s a choice presented to the reader, not a 
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single vision of "culture sinking into an equilibrium of 
meaninglessness. ,,2 
The problem of applying an abstract literary category 
becomes apparent from even a superficial examination of the 
work. Viewed as a short story, "Entropy" seems to be a 
failure. It contains three distinct settings, two seemingly 
unrelated plots, and little characterization. Only the 
overwhelming amount of precise detail suggests that this 
"short story" might be unified at a symbolic level. 
The bare action occurs in three spatially distinct 
areas: in Callisto's apartment, in Meatball's apartment be-
low Callisto's, and outside the two apartments. A surface 
examination of this action gives few clues as to its mean-
ing. Outside, it is raining. Downstairs, Meatball is 
giving a lease-breaking party. Various people come and go, 
including Saul who has had a fight with his wife and the 
Duke di Angelis quartet which plays soundless music. The 
party becomes increasingly chaotic until Meatball can no 
longer tolerate the noise. He attempts to quiet the revelers; 
and the party dwindles. Upstairs, Callisto and Aubade spend 
their time recording his memoirs, attempting to cure a sick 
bird, and checking the outside temperature. When the bird 
dies and Aubade accepts the constant 370 temperature as de-
cisive, she breaks the window of their hermetically-sealed 
apartment and together they await the heat-death of the 
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universe. 
Characterization, too, is minimal. Nowhere in the 
story can physical descriptions of the characters be found. 
Meatball, the most fully developed character (in a Jamesian 
sense) is realized primarily by his behavior. He moves 
from group to group and carries on conversations. Only at 
the conclusion of "Entropy" are his thoughts portrayed. 
The way he figured, there were only about two 
ways he could cope: (a) lock himself in the closet, 
or (b) try to calm everybody down, one by one (p. 291). 
Meatball's thoughts center on coping with the immediate 
situation, not on comprehending it. His guests are simi-
larly, but less extensively, developed. Upstairs, Callisto 
is realized by his limited behavior, his memoirs, and his 
reminiscences, all of which center on his obsession with 
classical thermodynamics. Aubade, his girl, is even more 
puzzling. From the outset she seems more an abstraction 
than a human being • 
. She was part French and part Annamese, and she 
lived on her own curious and lonely planet, where 
the clouds and the odor of poincianas, the bitter-
ness of wine and the accidental fingers at the 
small of her back or feathery against her breasts 
came to her reduced inevitably to the terms of 
sound: of music which emerged at intervals from a 
howling darkness of discordancy (p. 280). 
Callisto and Aubade are developed as "characters" whose 
ideas seem more important than their individuality. Thus, 
it should be apparent that depth of personality is not a 
concern in "Entropy." 
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What is remarkable about the work is its overwhelming 
preciseness of detail. The first encounter with the Duke 
di Angelis quartet is a good example. 
In the living room Duke, Vincent, Krinkles and Paco 
sat crouched over a 15-inch speaker which had been 
bolted into the top of a wastepaper basket listening 
to 27 watts' worth of The Heroes Gate at Kiev 
(p. 277). - --
These details seem to be interwoven into intricate 
patterns centering primarily on various dimensions of weather 
and sound. 
The importance of these details to the content and 
form of "Entropy" will be discussed in greater detail later. 
At this pOint, however, some philosophical and scientific 
background seems necessary. 
Science has often been considered more exact or pre-
cise than humanistic endeavors. Yet, even in SCience, the 
problem of classification based on abstraction is important. 
Definition of atomic structure is a good illustration. Wave 
was originally a classification for impulses set up by a 
vibration; as such waves had no mass. Particle was a class-
fication for matter without magnitude, yet with character-
istics attributable to mass: inertia and force of attraction. 
Recently, physicists have discovered that what is called an 
atom exhibits characteristics both of waves and of particles. 
To classify atoms as either waves or particles would be to 
ignore some of the vital characteristics of atomic structure; 
yet to classify atoms as "wavicles" would necessitate a com-
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plete redefinition of waves and particles as well as a 
restructuring of the scientific theories based on the 
original definitions. 
What is important to recognize is that any process 
involving classification based on abstractions results in 
a loss of specific individual characteristics which mayor 
may not be important in another context. For example, in 
examining a discussion of entropy such as Wylie Sypher's 
chapter "Existence and Entropy,") a reader can rely on a 
dictionary definition of the term because Sypher clearly 
illustrates which characteristics of entropy are important 
to his discussion. However, in analyzing a story such as 
"Entropy," where the relationships are metaphorically de-
fined, more complete knowledge ~f the scientific concepts 
of entropy is necessary. OtherWise, the reason for center-
ing the work around entropy may be obscured. 
So far the problem of classification based on abstraction 
has been defined and illustrated by examples from literary 
criticism and from science. The two concepts of entropy rep-
resent a special case in this problem. Both are defined 
statistically. It is important to understand that statisti-
cal calculation is another method of classifying which is 
based on abstracting certain qualities from a group. In add-
ition, the application of statistics to each concept was 
originally based on different assumptions. 
Classical thermodynamics developed in the nineteenth 
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century as a result of experimentation with heat and engines. 
At this time most scientists believed that the universe 
was already determined and that scientific study would 
eventually lead to a precise definition of the absolute 
and unchanging laws of the universe. However, the results 
of scientific experiments did not precisely confirm the hy-
potheses. This imprecision was attributed to crude instru-
mentation; and the scientists felt that with more sophis-
ticated equipment their measurements would eventually be 
exact. Meanwhile, these scientists applied statistics to 
their formulas to compensate for what they regarded as in-
complete data. 
Thermodynamic entropy for example, was defined by 
Rudolph Clausius as a measure of energy which could not be 
transformed into work. Experimentation demonstrated that a 
system at equilibrium would not yield work because work is 
obtained from a heat differential. Equilibrium was defined 
as a state measured by maximum entropy. While equilibrium 
could be quantified, states containing energy both available 
and unavailable for work could not be quantified precisely. 
The reasoning behind the use of statistics followed a 
pattern similar to this: We cannot precisely measure energy 
yet. Clausius' theorem (in a closed system, the entropy 
always increases) does generally predict what happens in a 
machine. Let's use statistics to compensate for our imprecise 
measurements. We'll define maximum entropy as a norm or most 
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probable occurrence. Any state not at maximum entropy we 
can calculate in terms of deviation from the norm. When 
our measurements are precise enough, we should be able to 
dispense with statistics. 
With the findings of Heisenberg, Schrodinger, and Born 
in quantum mechanics and of Einstein in relativity, a new 
view of statistics was formulated. Alfred M. Bork sum-
marizes this development. 
Statistical ideas had been used in the nineteenth-
century physics, but then it was always assumed that 
the basic laws were completely deterministic. Sta-
tistical calculations were made when one lacked 
complete information or because of the complexity of 
the system involved. In the statistical interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics I have just described, 
however, randomness is not accepted purely for cal-
culational purposes. It is a fundawental aspect of 
the basiC physical laws themselves. 
Information theory is based on this new view of 
statistics. From the outset, information was defined 
statistically and operationally: it "is a function of the 
ratio of the number of possible answers before and after 
a specific problem is solved, and we choose a logarithmic 
law in order to insure additivity of the information con-
tained in independent situations.,,5 It is easier for a non-
SCientist to understand what information is not. Infor-
mation is not a "thing" which can be measured precisely; 
instead it is the expression of a relationship. Information 
does not contain meaning or value; these are considerations 
beyond the scope of present scientific theory. Information 
is based entirely on unpredictability or deviation from a 
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norm. 
Entropy of information was defined by C. E. Shannon 
as the physical source of information. The term entropy 
was used because of the mathematical similarity between 
thermodynamic entropy (~) and information (£=_1).6 'Nhat 
is important to remember 1s that despite the mathematical 
similarity there is no physical connection between the two 
entropies. 7 
The importance of this involved discussion is twofold. 
First, statistical calculations are used in conjunction 
with both concepts of entropy. This indicates that a measure-
ment represented by either concept is always an approxi-
mation. Thermodynamic entropy is never a precise measure-
ment of the amount of energy unavailable for work in a given 
system at a given time. Entropy of information is never a 
measurement of the amount of information a system can yield. 
Second, the historical development of thermodynamics and of 
information theory suggests that two world views may be 
operating Simultaneously in "Entropy." This will become 
apparent when the separate apartments are discussed. For the 
present, this discussion will show how the statistical base 
of the scientific entropies 1s reflected 1n "Entropy.1t 
I have already pOinted to Pynchon's use of precise de-
tail and to the physically distinct settings. The narrator 
o:f "Entropy" belongs to the "outside" although he does des-
cribe the action in the apartments. In several passages in 
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the work, the narrator deliberately qualifies the precise 
detail by showing how the process of abstraction can be 
misleading. 
The narrator's view of the rain is a good illustration 
of this. (This view is tied to Meatball metaphorically with 
the opening sentence but does not represent his thoughts or 
position.) Rain is deliberately and precisely drawn in 
terms of physical sensation. 
Outside there was rain. Rain splatted against the 
tar paper on the roof and was fractured into a fine 
spray off the noses, eyebrows and lips of the wooden 
gargoyles under the eaves and ran like drool down 
the windowpanes (p. 278). 
The description becomes more abstract as it covers more time 
and experience. 
The day before it had snowed and the day before that 
there had been winds of gale force and before that 
the sun had made the city glitter bright as April, 
though the calendar read early February (p. 278). 
Yet, as the additional dimensions become more abstract, the 
original precision of the detail is qualified. 
It is a curious season, this false spring. Somewhere 
in it are Lincoln's Birthday and the Chinese New Year 
and a forlornness in the streets because cherry blossoms 
are weeks away still and, as Sarah Vaughan has put it, 
spring will be a little late this year. Generally 
crowds like the one which would gather in the Old 
Heidelberg on weekday afternoons to drink Wurtzburger 
and to sing Lili Marlene (not to mention The Sweetheart 
of Sigma Chi) are inevitably and incorrigibly Romantic 
(p. 278). 
By classifying the crowds singing Lili Marlene and The 
Sweetheart of Sigma Chi as RomantiC, the narrator has de-
liberately emphasized a peripheral meaning of the philosoph-
ical concept (represented by Romanticism). This can be seen 
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as irony; but more important, it emphasizes the impreCise, 
approximate nature of the abstraction_ The process is not 
accidental; for again a peripheral meaning of soul is used 
to shift the context. 
And as every ~ood Romantic knows, the soul (spiritus, 
rauch, pneuma) is nothing, substantially but air; it 
is only natural that warpings in the atmosphere should 
be recapitulated in those who breathe it (p. 278). 
The philosophical context of soul (Romanticism) is quickly 
shifted to a scientific context (air, which has little sub-
stance) and then to science fiction (with "warpingsu ). By 
deliberately shifting contexts and abstraction levels, the 
narrator is demonstrating the dangers of such a shift. 
(Essentially, the effect of the passage is to assert that 
changeful weather causes Romanticism.) The significance of 
this process is underlined by the realization of the weather's 
effect in an extended metaphor of Brownian motion. 
So that over and above the public components--holidays, 
tourist attractions--there are private meanderings, 
linked to the climate as if this spell were a stretto 
passage in the yearJs.fugue; haphazard weather, aim-
less loves, unpredicted commitments: months one can 
easily spend in fugue, because oddly enough, later 
on, winds, rains, passions of February and March are 
never remembered in that City, it is as if they had 
never been (pp. 278-79). 
The suggestion of Brownian motion in the passage ties 
the process of verbal abstraction to scientific abstraction. 
Brownian motion occurs Simultaneously with and independently 
from an increase in thermodynamic entropy. Because this 
motion is random, it cannot be measured precisely. Brownian 
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motion, then, is a major factor in necessitating the use 
of statistics, even in classical thermodynamics. Albert 
Einstein summarized the shift in his paper on kinetic theory • 
• • • it will be shown that according to the mole-
cular-kinetic theory of heat, bodies of microscopically 
visible Size, suspended in a liquid, will perform move-
ments of such magnitude that they can easily be ob-
served in a microscope on account of the molecular 
motions of heat. It is possible that the movements 
to be discussed here are identical with the so-called 
"Brownian molecular motion." ••• if the movement 
discussed here can actually be observed. .' • then 
classicalthermodynam1cs can no longer be looked on 
as applicable with precision to bodies even of dimensions 
distinguishable in a rn1croscope. 8 
The subsequent confirmation of Einstein's findings reinforces 
the epistemological position taken by the narrator in 
ltEntropy." 
Just as Brownian motion occurs simultaneously with and 
independently from an increase in thermodynamic entropy, 
the "private meanderings" are trover and above the public 
components." Like the random movement of molecules, the 
"private meanderings" are "Romantic" (individual), "aim-
less, n "haphazard," and nunpredicted." They occur "in 
fugue," not linked by a cause-effect relationship. Finally, 
the "winds, rains, passions ••• are never remembered ••• it 
is as if they had never been" because like Brownian motion, 
they eXist but have no effect. 
The precision with which the final statement is realized 
contrasts with the deliberate misuse of abstraction earlier 
to point to the approximation characteristic of abstraction. 
It seems to me that through his deliberate emphasis on the 
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incompleteness in abstraction in some passages and his 
attention to precise detail in others, the narrator is 
raising--and answering--the epistemological question inherent 
in any process of abstraction: how do we know what we know? 
His process of metaphorical development seems to indicate that 
we know what we know first, from physical sensations which a-
rise from isolated "facts" (such as the rain) and second, from 
that process of abstraction which is applied to these "facts." 
This process of abstraction is consistently an approximation 
which mayor may not include certain significant character-
istics of the "fact." 
Finally, the use of weather in the passage indicates 
a possible explanation for the epigraph. In the passage 
the weather is a "given," a fact, to which significance 
is attributed by the narrator. This significance is real-
ized in terms of sound; and the relationship between the 
humans and the weather is characterized as "in fugue." (The 
sound metaphors are related to ontological issues, as I will 
demonstrate later.) The use of "fugue" suggests the unity 
of experience and, by extension, the artificiality of ab-
straction. ThUS, the weather represents an epistemological 
given (discussed earlier). The epigraph, a passage about 
weather, also functions as a "given." 
Boris has just given me a summary of his views. He 
is a weather prophet. The weather will continue bad, 
he says. There will be more calamities, more death, 
more despair. Not the slightest indication of a 
change anywhere • • • We must get into step, a lock-
step toward the prison of death. There is no escape. 
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The weather will not change. 
-Tropic £f Cancer (p. 277) 
Thus, the epigraph establishes the finality of the 
epistemological "given." The weather, like the process of 
abstraction, will not change. Men can get into "a lock-
step toward death" by refusing to "know" anything. However, 
man still has a choice of alternative uses of abstraction 
which will enable him to "known reality with various degrees 
of approximation. 
In "Entropy" the narrator uses the method of abstraction 
he has established in the weather passage to undercut the 
assumptions of Callisto and Aubade. For example, their 
"paradise" is less than ideal. 
Mingled with the sounds of the rain came the first 
tentative, querulous morning voices of the other birds, 
hidden in philodendrons 'and small fan palms: patches 
of scarlet, yellow, and blue laced through this 
Rousseau-like fantasy, this hothouse jungle it had 
taken him seven years to weave together. Hermetically 
sealed, it was a tiny enclave of regularity in the 
City's chaos, alien to the vagaries of the weather, 
of national politics, of any civil disorder. Through 
trial-and-error Callisto had perfected its ecological 
balance, with the help of the girl its artistic 
harmony, so that the swayings of its plant life, the 
stirrings of its birds and human inhabitants were all 
as integral as the rhythms of a perfectly-executed 
mobile! He and the girl could no longer, of course, be 
omitted from that sanctuary; they had become necessary 
to its unity. What they needed from outside was de-
livered. They did not go out (p. 279). 
Callisto has created a paradise; but like human creations, 
the paradise has flaws. Even though it is realized through 
attention to sensory stimulation, it is also like a "per-
fectly-executed mobile" which delights but does not provide 
complete satisfaction. Ultimately, it depends on the outside 
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for physical needs and for contact with "reality" (rep-
resented by the penetrating sounds and the weather). 
Callisto's microcosm is an abstraction; and any abstraction 
depends on those very "things" from which it was created. 
The success of Callisto's artistic creation depends on his 
being an ideal; unfortunately, he is fallible (the death of 
the bird is not caused by an absence of heat transfer and 
the constant 370 temperature is not the omen of impending 
universal heat-death). 
In another passage, the narrator illustrates how 
Aubade, too, abstracts from hlxman experience without con-
sidering alternative possibilities. 
In the hothouse Aubade stood absently caressing the 
branches of a young mimosa, hearing a motif of sap-
rising, the rough and unresolved anticipatory theme 
of those fragile ~ink blossoms which, it is said, 
insure fertility (p. 287). 
Neither Aubade nor the reader can know that the tree will 
blossom and bear fruit until it actually happens. Other 
factors such as disease and adequate nourishment can affect 
the blossoming and fruition of a tree. By deliberately 
couching Aubade's experience in terms of qualified ab-
stractions ("hearing a motif," "unresolved anticipatory 
theme") the narrator is again pointing to the imprecision 
and deception inherent in abstraction. 
Related to the epistemological "given" based on the 
nature of abstraction is the idea of ontology: what is 
reality? The epistemological assumption indicates that 
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because man must rely on abstraction lIto know what we know," 
"reality" (what we know) is also an abstraction. Thus, any 
one human experience can result in multiple concepts of 
"reality." The existence of two such concepts is indicated 
by a comparison of the Meatball view of the weather (which 
was discussed earlier as attached to Meatball but delinaated 
by the narrator) with Callisto's view. Since their apart-
ments are close together, presumably each tenant is ex-
periencing the same phenomenon. 
But for three days now, despite the changeful weather, 
the mercury had stayed at 370 Farenheit. Leery at 
omens of apocalypse, Callisto shifted beneath the 
covers. His fingers pressed the bird more firmly, as 
if needing some pulsing or suffering assurance of an 
early break in the temperature (p. 280). 
Unlike the Meatball view which focuses on change, unpre-
dictability, and deception as qualities of the weather, 
Callisto sees the constant 370 temperature as an omen of 
apocalypse, which subsequently develops as a vision of the 
heat-death of the universe. 
Ironically, it is Callisto who names his own method 
of abstracting while hoping to avoid it. 
He was aware of the dangers of the reductive fallacy 
and, he hoped, strong enough not to drift into the 
graceful decadence of an enervated fatalism (p. 283). 
Reductionism arises out of a Newtonian world view which 
assumes, among other things, that the universe is like a 
giant machine operating on consistent, ultimately compre-
hensible principles. Therefore, a construct of "reality" 
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can be made by separating, classifying, and analyzing 
its component parts until the basic nstuff tf of the universe 
is reached and analyzed. Once the "stuff" is reached, ab-
solute laws of the universe can be formulated by reversing 
this process (reconstructing the machine). Ultimately, the 
relationships between the laws can be established through 
the use of operational analogies. In classical thermo-
dynamics, for example, an increase in entropy was first 
observed at the macrocosmic level (in experiments with 
machines). The use of statistical calculation in further 
investigation revealed increases in entropy at microcosmic 
levels (in gases, for example). From this, the second law 
of thermodynamics was generalized to apply to any isolated 
system--including the universe. 
Callisto, by seeking "correspondences" between Gibbs' 
prediction and observable social phenomena, is trying to 
replace reductionism with analogy. Unfortunately, he fails 
to realize that the very processes of analogy and classi-
fication are potentially reductive. Thus, once Callisto has 
classified Madison Avenue advertising and American con-
sumerism as indications of an impending "heat-death for his 
culture," he has eliminated, in his own mind, alternative 
explanations. 
The alternative approach, represented by Meatball, is 
holism. This view assumes that experience of the universe 
and its physical manifestation are inseparable. As such, 
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no absolute assumptions or schematization of "reality" can 
be made. When experimentation or experience necessitates 
some contact with this "reality," the "reality" is broken 
into the largest manageable pieces and is dealt with in 
terms of the relationships between the pieces rather than 
in terms of the pieces themselves. In science, this pro-
cess is known as "systems theory;" and while it is a re-
ductive process, it admits more than one possible explana-
tion for phenomena because relations generalized in one 
system are not assumed to be applicable to different systems. 
Meatball seems to have few preconceived ideas about 
reality. His preference for alcohol over drugs is based on 
practical reasons. "Washington is lousy with Feds" (p. 281). 
In listening to Saul's problem, Meatball points to 
Saul's reductionism, "Maybe she thought you were acting 
like a cold, dehumanized sCientist type" (p. 285). "You're 
sort of, I don't know, expecting a lot from people" (p. 286). 
Finally, Meatball pOints to the problem of ontology. 
"Well, sure ••• you were using different words. By 
"human being" you meant something that you can look 
at like it was a computer. It helps you think better 
on the job or something. But Miriam meant something 
entirely--" (p. 286). 
The same approach can be seen in Meatball's discussion with 
Duke about soundless music. 
A horrified awareness was dawning on Meatball. 
"And the next logical extension," he said. 
"Is to think everything," Duke announced with 
Simple dignity. "Roots, line, everything." 
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Meatball looked at Duke, awed. "But," he 
said (p. 290). 
Meatball's "But" indicates that from his own experience, 
soundless music won't work. 
Finally, Meatball's approach to "reality" which avoids 
classification other than where it is verifiable by ex-
perience has one additional dimension. When he can no 
longer deal with "reality" as a whole (as when the noise 
and chaos of the party become unbearable and unmanageable), 
Meatball resorts to what seems to be a "systems" approach. 
So he decided to try and keep his lease-breaking 
party from deteriorating into total chaos: he gave 
wine to the sailors and separated the mura players; 
he introduced the fat government girl ~andor ROjas, 
who would keep her out of trouble; he helped the girl 
in the shower to dry off and get into bed; he had 
another talk with Saul; he called a repairman for the 
refrigerator, which someone had discovered was on the 
blink. This is what he did until nightfall, when 
most of the revellers had passed out and the party 
trembled on the threshold of its third day (pp. 291-92). 
As the passage indicates, Meatball is less concerned with 
the nature of "reality" than he is with functioning within 
it. However limited his understanding of "reality" is, 
his approach is more accurate than Callisto's because he 
allows for alternative explanations. 
Aubade has the most unusual approach to t'reali ty." Unlike 
Callisto and Meatball who emphasize human experience as a 
source for ideas of "reality," Aubade's approach is highly 
theoretical and second-hand. Not only do sensuous ex-
periences reach her "reduced inevitably to the terms of 
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sound" (as I noted earlier), but she is constantly forced 
to readjust her concept of "reality" to include new, pre-
viously unclassified phenomena. 
Counterpointed against his words the girl heard the 
chatter of birds and fitful car honkings scattered 
along the wet morning and Earl Bostic's alto rising 
in occasional wild peaks through the floor. The 
architectonic purity of her world was constantly 
threatened by such hints of anarchy: gaps and ex-
crescences and skew lines, and a shifting or tilting 
of planes to which she had continually to readjust 
lest the whole structure shiver into a disarray of 
discrete and meaningless signals (p. 283). 
Aubade's reductionism, an obsession for order reduced to 
musical terms, is complete. The greater danger lies beyond 
her reliance on abstraction, for she depends entirely on 
Callisto for "feedback" (in this case referring to direct 
experience). She cannot point out fallacies in his thinking 
because she has accepted his assumptions. She has only the 
power to follow them to their logical conclusion. 
I have demonstrated how the weather and sound images 
establish the epistemological and ontological dimensions 
of "Entropy.1t These dimensions, however, do not represent 
the complete theme. Instead, they function as hypotheses 
in an experiment designed to determine the human value of 
these ideas. For this theme, the hypotheses must be 
tested in terms of metaphorical and behavioral interactions. 
It should be apparent that "Entropy" is a story of 
ideas rather than personalities and that these ideas are 
controlled by scientific and metaphorical concepts of entropy. 
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Entropy is an effective metaphor in that the two scientific 
concepts of entropy are physically unrelated and theoretically 
related. 
The scientific paradox is realized in "Entropy" by 
the use of two apartments. These apartments roughly 
correspond to the two physically unrelated fields of thermo-
dynamics and information theory. Callisto's apartment re-
presents the world of thermodynamic entropy in which every-
thing is slowly evolving toward sameness and equilibrium. 
In Meatball's apartment, entropy of information dominates. 
Here, value is placed on the new and the unpredictable. 
Yet, the metaphorical structure contradicts this. Weather 
and sound are common experiences in both apartments. This 
is necessary to indicate the unity of experience and the 
theoretical relationship between the scientific concepts. 
The resolution of the paradox in "Entropy" lies in 
the realization that the interpretations of weather and 
sound are radically different. If the interactions between 
weather and sound yield various approaches to reality, 
sound images ultimately determine the theme of the story. 
This occurs because sound is a source of information; and 
information is the basis for establishing the meaning and 
value of human experience as well as the method for signify-
ing this value. Saul indicates this by describing the 
value humans attach to sound symbols. 
There are Europeans wandering around North Africa 
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these days with their tongues torn out of their heads 
because those tongues have spoken the wrong words. 
Only the Europeans thought they were the right words 
(p. 285). 
Information, however, is not a complete solution to 
problems of human value. In the first place, little is known 
about the value and use of information. 
"I don't know anything about communication theory." 
"Neither does my wife. Come right down to it, 
who does? That's the joke" (p. 284). 
The process of receiving information without classifying it 
is confusing as well as disappointing like a "stretto passage 
in the year's fugue" (p. 279). Changing one's concept of 
"reality" to fit each "bit" of information as Aubade tries 
to do is equally defeating. The process results in con-
tinuous readjustment" lest the whole structure shiver into 
a disarray of discrete and meaningless signals" (p. 283). 
Sensuous experience is dulled by this process. One "hears 
a motif of sap-rising" (p. 287) rather than feels the rough 
branches or smells the fragile pink blossoms of a mimosa 
tree. Ultimately, the process results in human exhaustion 
and in separation from human relationships. 
She crawled into dreams each night with a sense of 
exhaustion, and a desperate resolve never to relax 
that vigilance. Even in the brief periods when 
Callisto made love to her, soaring above the bowing 
of taut nerves in haphazard double stops would be 
the one singing string of her determination (p. 283). 
Reducing information to a single vision of "reality" 
as Callisto attempts to do is equally limiting. It leads 
to a very limited, and possibly erroneous, set of judgments. 
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Music, and literature for example, confirm Callisto's vision 
of heat-death. 
Sade, of course. And Temple Drake, gaunt and hope-
less in her park in Paris, at the end of Sanctuary. 
Final equilibrium. Nightwood. And the tango. Any 
tango, but more than any perhaps the sad sick dance 
in Stravinsky's L'Histoire du Soldat (p. 287). 
Such improbably related occurrences as the death of a bird 
and a constant 370 temperature confirm Callisto's vision of 
heat-death. 
Ultimately, both Aubade's and Callisto's approaches 
lead to impotence and meaninglessness. Their tentatively 
balanced relationship has collapsed under the power of 
Callisto's reductive ontology. Aubade's structure turns 
into "the ashes of her lovely world t1 (p. 292), destroyed 
by Callisto's irrefutable interpretation of the constant 
temperature. Together, they wait until 
the hovering, curious dominant of their separate 
lives should resolve into a tonic of darkness and 
the final absence of all motion (p. 292). 
The action in Callisto's apartment is concluded in terms 
of music (dominant-tonic) and in terms of thermodynamiC 
entropy. Maximum entropy represents a state from which no 
information can be extracted. There is no heat or energy 
differential, only uniformity. 
On the other hand, holistic or systems approaches to 
information have their drawbacks. Information must somehow 
be separated from noise. 
Tell a girl: 'I love you.' No trouble with two thirds 
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of that, it's a closed circuit. Just you and she. 
But that nasty four-letter word in the middle, that's 
the one you have to look out for. Ambiguity. Redun-
dance. Irrelevance, even. Leakage. All this is nOise. 
Noise screws up your signal, makes for disorganization 
in the circuit (p. 285). 
As Saul indicates, the problem occurs when the same word 
contains both information and noise. 
Information can also be irrelevant, as in the exchange 
between Meatball and Sandor Rojas. 
"Meatball," Sandor Rojas yelled from the kitchen. 
"Somebody is trying to come in at the window. A 
burglar, I think. A second story man." "What are 
you worrying about~" Meatball said. "We're on the 
third floor" (p. 2~1). . 
Information is often ambiguous, as Krinkles's "put-on" 
indicates. 
"When Dave was in the army, just a private E-2, they 
sent him down to Oak Ridge on special duty. Some-
thing to do with the Manhattan Project. He was 
handling hot stuff one day and got an overdose of 
radiation. So now he's got to wear lead gloves all 
the time." She shook her head symp~thetically\ "What 
an awful break: for a piano player" tpp. 286-87J. 
This ambiguity can be harmless; or it can be the basis for 
serious misunderstandings, such as the fight between Saul 
and Miriam. 
"Miriam has been reading science-fiction again. That 
and Scientific American. It seems she is, as we say, 
bugged at this idea of computers acting like people. 
I made the mistake of saying you can just as well 
turn that around, and talk about human behavior like 
a program fed into an IBM machine." 
"Why not, n Meatball said. 
"Indeed, why not. In fact it is sort of crucial 
to communication, not to mention information theory. 
Only when I sald that she hit the roof. Up went the 
balloon. And I can't figure out why" (p. 285). 
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Finally, information can be false; and acting on 
false information can be very embarrassing, as the arrival 
of the sailors at Meatball's apartment shows. 
"This is the place," shouted a fat, pimply seaman 
apprentice who had lost his white hat. "This here is 
the hoorhouse that chief was telling us about. 'I A 
stringy-looking 3rd class boatswain's mate pushed 
him aside and cased the living room. "You're right, 
Slab," he said. "But it don't look like much, even 
for StateSide. I seen better tail in Naples, Italy." 
"How much, hey," boomed a large seaman with adenOids, 
who was holding a Mason jar full of white lightning. 
"Oh, my god," said Meatball (p. 287). 
In Meatball's apartment, few assumptions are made 
about "reality.- Information, representing what is new 
and unpredictable, is a close approximation of experiential 
data. But information can be ambiguous, irrelevant, noisy, 
and false because it carries no context, value, or meaning. 
These must be attributed by the humans who use it, and 
human ideas about "reality" are inevitably constructs. 
Two suggestions for dealing with information can be 
found in "Entropy." The first is described by the narr-
ator in the opening description of "outside." 
There were a lot of American expatriates around 
Washington, D.C., who would talk ••• about how 
someday they were going to go over to Europe for 
real but right now it seemed they were working for 
the government. Everyone saw a fine irony in this. 
They would stage, for instance, polyglot parties 
where the newcomer was sort of ignored if he couldn't 
carryon simultaneous conversations in three or four 
languages. They would haunt Armenian delicatessens 
for weeks at a stretch and invite you over for 
bulghour and lamb in tiny kitchens whose walls were 
covered with bullfight posters. They would have 
affairs with sultry girls from Andalucia or the Midi 
who studied economics at Georgetown. Their Dome was 
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a collegiate Rathskeller out on Wisconsin Avenue 
called the Old Heidelberg and they had to settle for 
cherry blossoms instead of lime trees when spring 
came, but in its lethargic way their life provided, 
as they said, kicks (pp. 277-78). 
By opening oneself to the widest possible range of ex-
perience (like using the largest possible sample for a 
statistical base), one assures that his construct of "realityn 
is based on as close and as accurate information as possible. 
At the same time, one must recognize the "fine irony" in-
herent in the discrepancy between information and that which 
it represents. Otherwise, one may become the unwitting 
victim of the ultimate cosmiC joke as the epigraph suggests 
and as Callisto is realized. 
Once the basic epistemological assumption is accepted, 
a choice of alternative ontological approaches presents it-
self. Like Callisto, one can reduce experience to a con-
struct of "reality;" like Aubade, one can continue to adjust' 
a construct of "reality" to experience; or like Meatball, 
one can avoid a single construct of "reality" as much as 
possible. In the terms of "Entropy" all ontological 
approaches have drawbacks; but Meatball's approach is most 
viable. Only Meatball's approach allows for a practical 
incorporation of new experience into a construct of "reality" 
because the approach allows for multiple explanations. 
Only Meatball's assumptions and behavior are not ironically 
undercut by the narrator. At the end of the story, only 
Meatball is shown to be capable of positive action. 
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To me this realization of Meatball indicates that 
while his approach is not a complete solution to the problems 
raised in "Entropy," it is the most positive choice of the 
three, from the narrator's point of view. The choice re-
mains the reader's, however, since the events in "Entropy" 
occurred "back then" in early February of '57" (p. 277). 
I!Entropy" raises additional issues which I have neither 
time nor space to treat. Let me suggest a few, however. 
There is a strong indication that Callisto and Aubade, re-
spectively, represent the reductionist tendencies of science 
and art, and that Saul and Duke, respectively, represent 
the non-reductionist hopes of sCience and art. "Entropy" 
does indicate, too, that Aubade has relied too heavily on 
Callisto for her ideas. Does this mean that Meatball (man-
kind) needs to see art and science in new ways? Does this 
also mean that art can't depend on science? 
In addition, the story raises serious questions about 
the nature of metaphor. Is it possible that metaphor, con-
structed with multiple referents and an eye toward hypoth-
esis, could be a greater source of !I truth" than reductionism 
or even systems analysis? Certainly, Pynchon, John Barth, 
and Kurt Vonnegut indicate this possibility. 
"Entropy" seems to me to be significant in that viewed 
as an exploration, it suggests further possibilities for 
literature beyond codification of forms of meaninglessness. 
Pynchon's more recent books seems to have their comic 
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and satiric roots, as well as their moralistic tendencies, 
in "Entropy". This needs to be explored further, but in 
closing let me suggest that the warning at the end of 
Gravi ty' s Rainbow is very similar to that of "Entropy. I' 
Our view of the world and its potential failure are our 
own responsibility. From the point of view of "Entropy," 
at least, we still have a chance. 
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Footnotes 
IThomas Pynchon, "Entropy," The Kenyon Review, 
22 (1960), 277-93. Subsequent quotations from the story 
will be indicated solely by page number. 
2Arthur Mizener, "The New Romance," The Southern 
Review, 8 (Winter, 1972), 106-17. Mizener's article is 
the only one I have found that analyzes "Entropy." The 
article is an attempt to define "new romance" as exemp-
lified by "Entropy" and by ~ Crying of Lot 49. His 
interpretation of "Entropyn is based primarily on the 
metaphorical dimensions developed within the story rather 
than on a clear understanding of the scientific concepts. 
Thus, some of his observations and his conclusion are 
faulty. I do not plan to refute his article directly. 
3Wylie Sypher, Loss of the Self in Modern Literature 
and Art (New York: Random House,-r9b2T; pp. 58-86. 
4Alfred M. Bork, "Randomness and the Twentieth Century," 
The Antioch Review, 27 (1967), 44. 
5Leon Brillouin, Science and Information Theory (New 
York: Academic Press, 1956), p:-i. 
6Claude E. Shannon and W. Weaver, The Mathematical 
Theory of Communication (Urbana: Univ. or-Illinois Press, 
1949), pp. 3-28. 
7There is, however, a theoretical relationship which 
is illustrated by the problem of Maxwell's Demon. This 
is carefully discussed in Brillouin, pp. 152-82. 
BAlbert Einstein, Investigations on the Theory of 
Brownian Movement, ed. R. Furth (New YorkT'"'!. P. button, 
1903), cited in Bork, pp. 42-43. 
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